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Growth in the first post-reform decade in Latin America has been disappointing, largely 
because of a severe slowdown after 1995 in the countries in South America.  Per capita 
income grew at only .9% per year between 1995 and 1999 compared to 2.7% for 1950-80 
and 1.5% for the nineties as a whole. What has gone wrong?  The paper finds that neither 
falling investment, volatile capital inflows nor the implementation of structural reforms is 
the problem.  Indeed relative growth performance across countries  is positively related to 
the amount of reform they adopted.  Instead the problem seems to relate to a significant 
reduction in the growth rate of exports since 1997.  Mexico, Costa Rica and the 
Dominican Republic did well, but every country in South America has suffered a 
reduction in exports with the exception of Colombia where they were constant.  Partly 
that is because the countries that are the main markets for Latin exports are not growing 
as fast as they were, but South America is also losing market share in those countries.   
The basic assumption of the new reform growth model is that exports will be a significant 
engine of growth.  It does not seem to be working out that way for South America.  It is 
not clear what the cause of the export slowdown is, but no export-led growth strategy is 
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For most Latin American countries, the 1990s have turned out to be a disappointment.  
Almost all of them adopted the reforms of the Washington consensus.  They controlled 
inflation, sold off state enterprises, lowered tariffs, opened their capital markets, reformed 
their tax systems, and lowered government deficits.  For a time, prior to the Tequila 
Crisis in 1995, things seemed to be going well.  Growth rates were much higher than they 
had been in the 1980s, and for some countries were even higher than they had been in the 
long period between World War II and the debt crisis.  Things were expected to get even 
better in the following years since in many countries the reforms had only recently been 
adopted and since it takes time to reap their full benefits.   
 
But it is not working out that way for most of the countries in the region.  Instead of 
accelerating, growth has declined, especially in the countries of South America.  Overall 
average per capita income growth between 1990 and 1995 was 2.9% per year.
2  That rate 
fell to .8% per year between 1995 and 1999.  Only two countries (Trinidad and Tobago 
and the Dominican Republic) did better in the last five years than they did in the previous 
four, and both of them are in the Caribbean.   
 
This decelaration of growth is particularly pronounced in South America.  Over the entire 
decade 91-99, growth in South America was 1.6% per year, in Central America 1.4%.  
But in the last five years growth in South America has fallen to .5% per year while in 
Central America and the Caribbean it fell to only 1.2% per year.  The 95-99 period was 
for South America a period of recurrent recessions in some countries (Argentina and 
Peru) and protracted recession in others (Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Ecuador and 
Venezuela (also Jamaica).  If one defines a recession year as one in which per capita 
income declines, the South American countries were in recession 40% of the time 
between 1995 and 1999.  In Central America the comparable figure was 20%, or 
excluding Jamaica, only 12% of the time.   
 
In thinking about growth rates or evaluating country performance, it is appropriate to 
compare  current with past performance avoiding periods of extreme volatility.  One is 
looking for estimates of long term growth rates which one cannot obtain from periods of 
recession and recovery.  For Latin America that suggests a comparison of growth in the 
1990s with growth in the thirty year period 1950-80 period to the debt crisis.  (See table 
one)  As the reader can see from the table, only five of the nineteen countries for which 
we have data significantly improved their performance. (Argentina, Chile, Dominican 
Republic, Peru and Ecuador)  Growth rates in Bolivia and Panama are about the same, 
and the rest of the countries are doing worse than they used to do.  If one looks at just the 
last five years, there are only four countries whose performance is better than the base 
period and nine for which per capita growth is now at least 2% per year below the base 
period.  In short, in the last five years something seems to have gone wrong especially in 
South America.  What could it be?  
 
In Costa Rica and Mexico, the slowdown over the 1995-99 period shown in table one is  
 
                                                
2 That is, for the years 1991-1994.  
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Source:  Base period data are taken from World Bank tables, data for the 1990s are from CEPAL data base. 
 
somewhat misleading because it reflects a single year of financial crisis early in the 
period. (Mexico, 1995 and Costa Rica 1996).  Growth trends in both countries have 
recovered strongly since those crises. These two countries probably should be added to 
the DR and Trinidad and Tobago as countries with positive growth trajectories and 
prospects at the end of the decade.  But the good news seems to stop there.  Argentina 
and Uruguay were both hit by the Tequila Crisis in 1995 and again in 1999 by Brazil’s 
devaluation in 1998.  There are at least eleven other countries in which the growth trends 
over the last five years are negative and another two (Bolivia and Honduras) which had a 











argentina  1.572 3.300 0.827 2
Bolivia 1.431 1.400 1.338 1
Brazil 4.016 1.000 0.734 2
chile 2.056 4.400 3.222 1
Colombia 2.402 0.500 -0.845 2
C. Rica 3.142 1.200 1.175 2
Ecuador 4.083 -0.200 -1.647 2
El Salvador 2.843 2.300 1.201 1
Guatamala 1.842 1.500 1.438 0
Honduras 1.375 0.200 -0.126 1
Mexico 3.388 1.300 0.895 1
Paraguay 2.637 -0.600 -1.300 4
Peru 1.864 2.900 2.576 1
R. Dom. 2.652 3.100 4.294 0
Uruguay 0.865 2.400 1.414 2
Venezuela 2.373 -0.300 -1.411 3
Jamaica 2.329 -0.500 -1.589 4
T+T 6.774 2.300 2.781 0
Panama 2.738 2.800 1.468 0
2.652 1.526 0.866 0.3053
3.009 1.420 1.154 0.2000
2.330 1.644 0.545 0.4000









Table 2: Growth Patterns: 1995-99 
Countries where growth is rising over 
period 1995-99 
Domincan Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Mexico* and Costa Rica* 
Countries where the growth trend is down 
over period 1995-99 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Jamaica,Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, Venezuela 
Countries with sharp fluctuations in growth 
and recessions particularly at end of decade 
Argentina, Uruguay, Honduras, Bolivia 
Countries with slow, but relatively steady 
growth 
Guatemala 
*Growth is lower than in 1991-4 because of one year of severe recession. 
 
What has gone wrong?  There are plenty of alternative candidates.  It could be that the 
investment rate has never recovered from the decline it suffered in the 1980s.  In that case 
the growth rate would be lower simply because the growth rate of fixed capital is lower.  
It could also be that the sharp reduction in the protection of import substitutes has 
reduced the domestic production of tradables by more than the hoped for expansion of 
exports has increased it.  It could also be that the international environment is now less 
favorable than it used to be in the 1950-80 period or than it was earlier in the 1990s.  
Reductions in capital flows after the Tequila Crisis in 1995 and the East Asia financial 
crisis in 1998 coupled with falling world prices for commodities all may be having a 
negative impact on the prospects and growth of Latin America.  Finally the effect on 
growth of the reforms themselves could be perverse.  We now consider each of these 
possibilities. 
 
Falling investment is not the problem 
 
It does not appear that the problem is a decline in capital formation, except in the three oil 
exporters: Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela where both investment and 
growth have fallen sharply.  Of the remaining 16 countries all but three increased their 
investment rate and for the region as a whole, gross investment as a percentage of GDP is 
slightly higher in the 1990s than it was in the base period.  
 
To focus on the question of whether changes in the rate of investment are why there have 
been changes in the growth rate of GDP it is useful to divide up the sample into one set of 
countries that grew significantly faster in the 1990s than they did in the base period,  
a set which grew significantly slower, and a third set whose growth rate is has not 
changed.  Note that this classification is based on a comparison of growth rates in per 
capita income. We can then ask to what extent membership in these three groups is   
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correlated with changes in investment rates.  For each of these groups we show the 
investment rate and the GDP growth rate in both the base period and the 1990s. (See 
table 3)   
 
Source:  Base period data are taken from World Bank tables, data for the 1990s are from CEPAL.  The 
investment ratios are in constant local currencies, where specific deflators are used for both investment and 
GDP 
 
Overall there does not seem to be any clear relationship between changes in investment 
and changes in growth, except for the three oil economies.  Some of the fast growers have 
raised their investment rates and some of the slow growers have lowered theirs, but an 
equal number have done the opposite.  For every case of a Chile that would support the 
positive link between investment and growth there are at least two or three such as 
Jamaica, Colombia or Brazil that would contradict it.   
 
The majority of countries are growing more slowly than they used to.  But table 3 tells us 
that for most of them that is not for want of investing.  In most cases they are investing 
even more than they used to.  The problem is that investment is not as productive in 
producing growth as it used to be.   
 gdp growth rates investment efficiency
1950-80 1990-98 1950-80 1990-98 1950-80 1990-98
argentina  20.83925 19 3.227787 5.2 6.456204 3.653846
chile 15.87329 31.6 4.2497 6.8 3.735155 4.647059
R. Dom. 19.61372 24.6 5.412405 4.8 3.623846 5.125
Peru 21.38037 25.4 4.678447 4.1 4.56997 6.195122
Uruguay 13.76361 14.7 1.796779 3.6 7.660161 4.083333
Brazil 21.25384 23.2 6.885859 2.5 3.086593 9.28
Colombia 19.81153 24.6 5.160219 3.5 3.839281 7.028571
C. Rica 22.11665 23.6 6.422899 3.6 3.443407 6.555556
Ecuador 21.03546 14.9 7.141495 2.5 2.945526 5.96
El Salvador 17.41697 18.2 6.017396 4.4 2.894437 4.136364
Guatamala 14.77687 10.7 4.689285 3.7 3.151198 2.891892
Honduras 19.28516 26.2 4.681968 3.3 4.119028 7.939394
Jamaica 25.16778 32 3.758114 0.4 6.696917 80
Mexico 20.55841 20.1 6.620653 2.7 3.105194 7.444444
Paraguay 18.90862 23 5.326408 2.1 3.549976 10.95238
T+T 27.68153 16.6 9.352346 2.5 2.959849 6.64
Venezuela 31.6658 15.3 6.16462 2.4 5.136699 6.375
Bolivia 22.98182 15.7 3.429397 3.7 6.701416 4.243243
Panama 25.20534 31.7 5.78462 4.3 4.357303 7.372093
Table 3:  Investment rates and growth 
Countries whose rate of growth in 90s is lower than base period
countries whose growth  in 90s is higher than base period
Countries whose rate of growth is the same in 90s and base period
investment rates
Note that  the three  groups are classified by gdp per capita, but this table 
shows the growth in GDP itself, for the purposes of the discussion in the text. 
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To show this we divide the investment rate by the growth rate and call the result the 
efficiency of investment.  That number tells us what fraction of GDP has to be devoted to 
investment to produce an extra percentage point of growth.   
Look now at the slow growing group.  What is apparent is a widespread fall in the 
efficiency of investment, true for every single country other than Guatemala.  All but the 
three oil countries and Guatemala increased their investment rate.  They are all growing 
more slowly because capital is not producing as much growth as it used to.  Each of these 
countries is having to save and investment much more than they used to just to maintain 
their growth rates.   
 
The reason for this sharp decline in investment efficiency is not at all clear.  It may come 
from technical factors.  Growth may be more capital intensive than it used to be.  It may 
require more investment in infrastructure and machinery than before.  But the decline 
may also reflect demand-induced recessions or external shocks.  Investment creates 
capacity.  but if for some reason the economy is unable to utilize that capacity because 
balance of payments pressure, financial crises or external shocks, investment will appear 
to be less efficient in producing growth than it would in an economy which is able to 
utilize all of its capacity.  Whatever the reason, the growth slowdown in the 1990s for the 
majority of countries was not due to a reduction in investment effort.  Most of these 
countries invested more than they used to.  But they got less growth for their efforts than 
before. 
 
Argentina and Uruguay are the exception to this pattern.  It used to take between six and 
seven percent of GDP to produce a one percent increase in the growth rate.  But the 
efficiency of investment has increased significantly in both countries so that it now takes 
only 3-4 percent of GDP to produce a percentage point increase in the growth rate.  
Argentina and Uruguay grew faster in the 1990s than in the base period, not because they 
invested a greater share of GDP, but because their economies became far more efficient 
in the use of capital resources.  Contrast that with the other three countries in the fast 
growing group.  All three of them grew faster in spite of the fact that there was a fall in 
the efficiency of investment.  They grew because they increased their investment rates.   
 
Exports and import substitution 
 
Probably the biggest single change in the growth strategy in Latin America has been the 
replacement of import substitution by exports.  There has been a dramatic reduction in 
tariff rates and other forms of protection.  It is not clear how this was expected to lead to 
an increase in exports, but there is no doubt that this was the expectation.  The strategy 
was not for the government to switch from protecting inefficient domestic manufacturing 
production to supporting more promising export activities.  On the contrary, the 
philosophy behind the reforms was to sharply reduce the government role in picking 
winners, subsidizing particular sectors, or promoting export activities.  The theory was 
that as the demand for imports increased in response to lower tariffs, balance of 
payaments pressure would force a devaluation that would lead to an expansion in exports.  
The market itself would determine which sectors could compete and which could not in  
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the new strategy.  Each economy would gain by concentrating its productive resources in 
the areas of its greatest comparative advantage.   
 
This scenario does not take into account the effect of inflows of capital.  If there is a 
significant increase in the inflow of capital, the expected currency devaluations may not 
take place.  If that happens a country will face the negative impact of lower protection on 
its manufacturing production without an offsetting positive impact on potential export 
activities. The actions of both foreign and domestic owners of capital are crucial in this 
regard.  Both are likely to be attracted by the reforms themselves-two in particular:  
macroeconomic policy reforms and privatization.  The reforms promised a better 
environment for capital, both foreign and domestic.  Government successfully controlled 
inflation, reduced their deficits, and stabilized their exchange rates.  At the same time 
they sold off state enterprises at attractive prices to foreign investors or domestic 
capitalists who repatriated funds held abroad to buy them.  All of this led to an avalanche 
of capital inflows to the region, reaching over $70 billion per year in the mid 1990s. 
 
For many observers, these capital inflows were a strong signal that the reforms were 
working and that Latin America was on the right tract.  But they could and did permit 
significant exchange rate appreciation in many countries, partly because those countries 
used the exchange rate to help control inflation.  The policy did achieve much lower 
inflation rates, but the appreciation stopped the process by which lower tariff protection  
was supposed  lead to a switch into export activities.  Rather than being forced to produce 
exports to pay for increased imports, countries could export IOU’s instead.  In the short 
run that would tend to reduce output and employment.  In short, the unintended side 
effect of successful reform could therefore be a big rise in imports not offset by rising 
exports and a net decline in the domestic production of tradables or of production 
altogether. 
 
Empirically, how important was exchange rate appreciation and the change in imports 
and exports in explaining relative growth performance?  Look first at exchange rate 
movements over the 1990s.  (See table 4)   In table four we have calculated the average 
real exchange rate indexes for two years at the beginning and the end of the decade.  In 
the table a fall in the index is an appreciation of the real rate.  The table tells us that real 
exchange rate appreciation has in fact been quite widespread in the region (13/18 
countries in the table), in nine of which the appreciation over the decade was more than 
ten percentage points.   
 
If one looks back at our classification of countries according to their growth performance 
in the 1990s in table two and movements in the real exchange rate, there is a clear 
negative correlation.  Three of the four countries where the growth rate was rising over 
the period 1995-1999 had a real depreciation between the early and late 1990s.  At the 
same time eight of the ten countries in which the growth trend was down in 1995-99 had 
a real appreciation.
3  The only exceptions are Costa Rica, Paraguay and Peru.  None of 
these three had really big exchange rate moves either one way or the other.   
 
                                                




A decomposition of changes in production 
 
Capital inflows and exchange rate appreciation appear to be a significant factor in many 
countries.  But we still have no way of evaluating their effects on exports or imports.  
Presumably appreciation reduced exports and increased imports relative to what they 
would have been otherwise.  Not having an econometric model of export and import 
demand, we address the impact question by estimating the contribution of changes in 
exports and imports to the observed overall change in demand over the 1990s.  Export 
pessimists think that the negative impact on production due to the fall in protection of 
imports coupled with exchange rate appreciation exceeded the positive stimulus of export 
expansion.  They expect that the net impact of reform-induced changes in foreign trade 
must have been to reduce domestic production.  We now do a decomposition of the total 
change in GDP to evaluate this claim.   
 
One way to decompose changes in GDP is to use an accounting identity such as Y = 
C+I+G+E-M.  However the trouble with that approach is that it cannot distinguish 
between the impact of exogenous changes and endogenous changes.  If consumption goes 
up, is that a cause of the rise in income or a result of that rise?  Most economists think 
that consumption depends on income, so most of the change in that variable is a result of 
average
91-92 97-98
argentina  109.65 98.40
Bolivia 85.55 93.70
Brazil 112.90 98.80
















Table 4: Real Exchange rate movements
Source:  CEPAL, Estudio Economico, 1998-1999.  
1995 = 100.   
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changes in Y not a cause for those changes.  To avoid this sort of problem we use a very 
simple demand side model which makes exports, government spending and exports 
exogenous, and which makes consumption, imports and tax revenues depend on income.   
 
1)  Y = C+I+G+E-M 
2)  C = c(1-t)Y 
3)  M=mY 
4)  T=tY 
 
 C is private consumption, I is gross investment, G is total government spending, E is 
exports, M is imports and c, t and m are average propensity to consume, the average 
tax rate and the import ratio.   
 
With this simple Keynesian model it follows that: 
 
5. Y = (I+G+E)/(s+t+m-ts) 
 
where s is household average saving rate out of disposable income. 
 
We can now calculate the different sources of the overall change in aggregate demand.  
The impact of a change in exports over any time period is the observed change in E times 
the multiplier 1/(s+t+m-ts).  The impact of a change in investment and government 
spending is calculated in the same way.  The impact of changes in imports, saving and 
taxes is the change in the multiplier resulting from the change in s, t or m times the initial 
level of I, G, and E.  Each of these component changes measures the change in aggregate 
demand that would be observed if that variable, and only that variable were changed.   
 
By construction, the sum of these six sources of change sums to the overall observed 
change except for a small cross-product term which is caused by the fact that the 
observed changes are not instantaneous.  In table five we have decomposed the overall 
change in GDP between 1990 and 1998 into these six component parts.  Recall that our 
main purpose here is to see what are the principal contributors to economic growth, and 
also to see whether rising imports offset the expansionary effect of export growth as some 
have claimed.  To help in interpretation we have grouped the countries according to 
whether their growth in the 1990s was greater or less than the base period, just as we did 
in table 3.  Note that all the data in the table are expressed relative to the total change in 
observed GDP.  For example in Argentina the absolute change in investment over the 
decade was 137% of the net overall change in GDP.  Exports added an additional 69% to 
the growth of demand.  The positive effect of exports however was more than offset by 











Consider now the contribution of exports and imports to the change in aggregate demand.  
In most countries exports are the biggest source of demand growth, adding  more than 
100% of the net increase in GDP in eight countries and more than 50% in an additional 
six.  Exports are the leading source of growth in twelve of the 17 countries for which we 
have data.  Brazil is a significant exception to this general pattern as is Honduras.    
 
As mentioned above, critics of trade liberalization have charged that the rise in imports 
more than offsets the expansionary effect of increased exports.  There appears to be some 
truth in this charge but only for a small number of countries mainly and specifically 
Argentina and Brazil.  In both of these countries, highly protected domestic 
manufacturing was penalized both by trade liberalization and currency appreciation.  For 
them as well as Paraguay and Uruguay, the external sector was a drain on domestic 
production. In 11 of the remaining 13 countries that is not the case.  For each of them 
export growth exceeded, sometimes by a wide margin, the negative effect of rising 
imports.   
 
In thinking further about the evidence, it is clear than one should make some allowance 
for the overall growth in aggregate demand.  One can think of two alternative models, 
one where a country grows rapidly and uses imports to meet rising demand.  That could 
be called benign import replacement.  That is the case in Chile and Uruguay.  But then 
there is the case of a Paraguay or a Brazil in which the import share rises rapidly but total 
























Argentina 1.370 0.690 0.000 2.060 0.000 -1.200 0.216 -0.984 1.076 1.000 0.575
Chile 0.601 0.637 0.061 1.299 -0.032 -0.349 0.110 -0.271 1.028 1.000 0.812
R. Dom 0.677 2.119 0.153 2.949 -0.046 -1.473 -0.328 -1.847 1.102 1.000 0.529
Peru 0.771 0.778 0.173 1.722 -0.115 -0.515 -0.043 -0.673 1.049 1.000 0.436
Uruguay 0.599 1.217 0.140 1.956 0.100 -1.234 0.204 -0.929 1.027 1.000 0.385
Brazil 1.715 0.478 0.000 2.193 0.000 -1.213 0.065 -1.149 1.045 1.000 0.255
Colombia -0.033 0.900 0.561 1.428 0.220 -0.330 -0.279 -0.389 1.039 1.000 0.363
C. Rica 0.304 1.479 0.063 1.845 -0.043 -0.678 -0.078 -0.798 1.047 1.000 0.372
Ecuador 0.357 1.068 -0.027 1.398 -0.062 -0.177 -0.134 -0.373 1.024 1.000 0.254
El Salvador 0.516 1.049 -0.128 1.436 -0.139 -1.088 0.840 -0.387 1.049 1.000 0.476
Guatemala 0.272 0.801 0.416 1.489 -0.154 -0.507 0.198 -0.463 1.025 1.000 0.389
Honduras 0.843 0.280 -0.045 1.078 -0.092 0.013 0.017 -0.063 1.015 1.000 0.336
Jamaica na na na na na na na na na na
Mexico 0.731 1.462 0.122 2.315 0.324 -1.112 -0.460 -1.247 1.068 1.000 0.269
Paraguay 0.291 1.082 0.385 1.758 -0.055 -1.766 1.127 -0.694 1.064 1.000 0.213
T+T na na na na na na na na na na
Venezuela -0.094 1.789 0.084 1.779 -0.171 -0.118 -0.332 -0.621 1.158 1.000 0.244
Bolivia 0.904 0.583 0.206 1.694 -0.136 -0.451 -0.063 -0.650 1.044 1.000 0.372
Panama 1.018 0.443 0.172 1.633 0.102 -0.455 -0.258 -0.611 1.022 1.000 0.462
Countries whose rate of growth is the same in the 90s as in the base period
Table 5:  The contribution of changes in conponents of GDP to overall growth 1990-98
countries whose rate of growth in 90s is higher than base period
Countries whose rate of growth in 90s is lower than in base period
Note:  contribution of each factor is total change due to the factor as a fraction of the total absolute change in gdp.  Investment is 
the sum of the change in investment each year times the multiplier, and the change in the three parameters is the change in the 
multiplier casued by the parameter change in each year times exogenous spending.   
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replacing domestic production instead of complementing domestic production during a 
period of rapid growth.  Yet it is hard to think of Paraguay as a case of import crowding 
out of domestic production since the economy was not a producer of manufactured 
imports to start with.  Rather the substitution must have been in consumption.  Too much 
of whatever expansion there was in domestic income came from consumption, and most 
of that must have gone into new imports.  The import ratio went up from 23% in 1990 to 
50% in 1998 in spite of very slow demand growth, particularly since 1995.
4   
 
The promise of trade liberalization was that it would shift production away from 
inefficient sectors and unleash a virtuous process of rapid, export-led growth.  Has that 
happened?  The answer is not in very many countries. If we say that export-led growth is 
where exports add more than 100% to aggregate demand and there is at least a 30% 
difference between the contribution of exports and imports, and GDP  grows faster than  
25% (2.5% per year) then only three countries, (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Mexico) meet the criterion.  Venezuela  is not in the group because of its very slow 
overall growth-the second slowest growing country in the entire region.  It is significant 
that these three  countries come from either Central America or the Caribbean.  There is 
not a single case of export led-growth in the countries south of Panama.  
 
 This does not mean that there has not been a significant change in import and export 
behavior.   There was a rise in the export share in every country in the region save 
Panama where it was already 99% in 1990, and a rise in the import share everywhere but 
Honduras.  Some of these changes were very large-they more than doubled in four 
countries.   
 
From the perspective of differences between fast and slow growers and its relationship to 
exports note that only one of the three cases of export led growth  comes from the fast 
growth group in table 5 (the DR).  All five of the rapid growers had good export growth. 
But that is not what distinguishes them from the other groups. On average their export 
growth contributed only slightly more than that of the slow growers, and their import 
contribution was actually a bigger offset. (The import share more than doubled in 
Argentina, Dominican Republic and Uruguay). But other than that what is different and 
significantly bigger is the contribution of investment.  It added 80% to demand in the fast 
growers group, and only 49% in the slow growers group.   What one can say is that in the 
fast growth group, exports rose a lot, supported by significant investment and a big 
increase in the share of imports.  The slow growing countries did not invest as much nor 
was there as big a change in the import ratio. 
 
For most countries, it would appear from the table that the biggest single contributor to 
growing aggregate demand was investment, not exports.  In eleven of the 17 countries for 
which we have data growing investment comprised at least 50% of the total increase in 
GDP over the period.  In all but five countries-(Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador 
Guatemala and Venezuela) it exceeds the contribution of exports net of imports. 
 
                                                
4 The reader may note that El Salvador also is a case where the rise in imports more than offsets the impact 
of rising exports.  But that is because of the extraordinary role of remittances in increasing consumption.    
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There are several countries for which private and public consumption are the primary 
sources of demand growth rather than either exports or investment.  Those countries are 
Colombia, Paraguay, Guatemala and El Salvador.  Salvador reflects the impact of 
remittances on household demand.  Colombia shows an extraordinarily expansionary 
fiscal policy in which both expansions in government spending plus falling tax rates 
together comprise almost 80% of the total increase in demand over the decade.  No other 
country comes close to that pattern.
5  Indeed in most countries the net impact of 
government, taking spending and tax rates together is minimal.  Rising tax rates in eleven 
of the countries, offset most or in four cases all of the increase in government spending.     
 
Another characteristic of the period is the amount of structural change in behavioral 
parameters in most countries, particularly the propensity to import.  Recall that if there 
had been no change in saving, tax or import shares, any change in aggregate demand 
would have come from changes in exogenous spending ( C+I+G).  In every case those 
parameter changes were contractionary either because imports increased or tax 
and/saving rates went up.  Overall those contractionary changes offset at least 50% of the 
growth in exogenous spending in 11/17 cases,  Rising imports were the biggest of  the 
three factors.  In most countries the 1990s were a period of significant increases in the 
extent to which imports satisfied increases in domestic demand. 
 
 Latin America has converted to an outward looking growth strategy.  For some countries 
that strategy has worked well. They had  a  change in production structure complemented 
by vigorous increases in investment and good growth.  I would include Chile, Uruguay, 
the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and Mexico in that group, the latter because of their 
strong growth fueled by exports at the end of the decade.  But there are too many 
countries where that approach has not worked.  Some like Honduras never really had a 
change in production structure or much of an increase in exports.  In others such as 
Venezuela, Paraguay and Ecuador, exports provided what growth there was, but that was 
not enough to support adequate growth for the entire economy.  The oil economies faced 
sharp reductions in the terms of trade, and the other economies were unable to find an 
export niche promising enough to serve as the base for rapid growth.   
 
Brazil and Argentina are special cases.  Not surprisingly, Brazil has not done well under 
this model.  Part of that is the result of macroeconomic policy mistakes which we will 
discuss in a moment.  But it also follows from the differences between Brazil and the 
other economies of the region.  Brazil had the largest and most domestic manufacturing 
sector in the region, mainly supplying its large internal market.  At the beginning of the 
decade its import ratio was only 7%.   Sharply reducing protection over the short run 
meant the destruction of a good deal of domestic production.  Tariff reductions amplified 
by the appreciation of the currency exacted a high cost on the Brazilian economy.  It is 
unlikely that exports could have grown fast enough to offset this rising imports, simply 
due to Brazil’s large size and the range of raw material based products which are its main 
exports.   
 
                                                
5 The nearest is Mexico with the change in G adding 12% and falling tax rates another 32% to total 
demand.   
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The 1990s have been a period of highly unstable and highly selective inflows of foreign 
capital.  Capital began to flow into the region in large quantities in the early 1990s after 
the resolution of the foreign debt problem and the beginning of privatization.  But these 
inflows were interrupted by the Tequila Crisis in 1995-6 and the Asian financial crisis in 
1998-9.  In Mexico the net transfer of resources (inflows of capital less amortization 
payments, interest and dividends) fell from over +$18 billion in 1992-3 to –$9 billion in 
1996. Net capital inflows to Brazil fell from $19 billion in 1995-96 to only $1.4 billion in 
1999.  Since most countries in the region were dependent on capital inflows to finance 
current account deficits, sharp fluctuations in the availability of external capital could 
have caused the observed fluctuations in growth and the downturn in growth at the end of 
the decade.   
 
However the historical evidence does not really support that interpretation in most 
countries.  First of all, there are many countries that have not had significant fluctuations 
in the flow of external resources.  In Bolivia, Uruguay, Honduras, Guatemala Paraguay 
and El Salvador there has been a fairly steady but small  positive inflow of foreign 
capital.  In Venezuela and Ecuador there has been a fairly steady outflow of capital.  
Fluctuations in the growth rate could not be driven by volatility in capital inflows for 
these countries.  In Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, net resource transfer turned 
negative in exactly the period when these two economies were growing rapidly.
6   
 
For the remaining countries which both had large inflows and large fluctuations (Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Colombia), if one plots growth rates against net resource 
transfers over the decade, it would be more accurate to say that NRT lagged changes in 
the growth rate rather than causing them.  Brazil’s case is typical.  NRT peaked in 1995-
96 when the growth rate was falling from its peak in 1994.  In Argentina, growth peaked 
in 1997 but NRT peaked the following year.  The same is true for Colombia and Peru.  In 
Mexico there undoubtedly is a relationship between growth and inflows with rising 
growth and increases in capital inflows going together at the end of the decade.  But like 
the other countries, changes in NRT lagged behind changes in the growth rate in 1994-95, 
and then lagged behind in the subsequent recovery.   We conclude that for the most part 
fluctuations in growth, and by inference, the growth slowdown at the end of the decade 
could not have been caused by variations in the inflow of foreign capital.  Growth 






                                                
6 In the DR net resource transfer has been negative since 1993, and in Costa Rica net resource transfer 
turned negative in 1998 and 1999, just when the country was recovering strongly from its banking crisis 
several years earlier.    
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The impact of the reforms 
 
Whatever it is that is causing the slowdown in growth in the region in the 1990s, it is not 
the reforms.  To show we use a measure of reforms in five areas developed by Lora  
(1998 ) and Morley et al (1999).  The Lora-Morley index measures the degree to which 
each country in the region has reformed relative to the most reformed country in five 
different areas: trade reform, capital account liberalization, tax reform, financial reform, 
and privatization.  If one takes the average reform index in 1995 and relates it to the 
change in the growth rate between the 1950-80 base period and the 1990s, in a cross 
country regression, there is a significant positive relationship between the reform index 
and the change in the growth rate. (See figure 1)  Those that were further along in the 
reform process had a better chance of improving their growth performance than those that 
had reformed less.  The relationship is not close but it is unmistakably positive and also 
significant.   Not only the change in the growth rate but also the growth rate in the 1990s 
alone are both positively related to the level of reform in 1995.   The positive relationship 
holds even in the more turbulent five-year period, 1995-99.  (See figure 2).  
 
.  


















































Chg GR = -19 +22.2*Reform index
                        (7.53) std error         R2 = .37
Comparison is between the base period and the 1991-
99 period.  Reform index here is average of five 
subindexes of reform. 
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What explains the downturn in growth after 1995? 
 
As noted as the outset of this paper, there has been a significant downturn in growth in 
the region since 1995.  All but two of the countries in our sample grew more slowly in 
the last four years than they did in the previous five.  The slowdown is particularly severe 




The main reason for this deterioration in performance is a serious and widespread decline 
in exports affecting almost every country in the region.  That reduction has forced most  
 
economies onto a slower growth path in order to reduce the volume of imports and 
conserve foreign exchange.  There are exceptions to this pattern of course, the most 
important being Mexico.  The good performance in Mexico, Costa Rica and the 
Dominican Republic hides the bad performance of the export sector elsewhere.  Exports 
rise by 22% between 1997 and 1999 in those three economies but fall by 9% in the rest of  
the region.  That permitted a 26% rise in imports for the three and forced a 16% decline  
 
elsewhere.  (See table 6)  Part of the poor export performance is related to the collapse of 
oil prices in 1998 and 1999.  but that is not the only explanation.  Every country in Latin 
America suffered a reduction in exports with the exception of Colombia where they were 
approximately constant.  Every country in Central America north of Panama had an 
increase in its exports.  Mexico and Costa Rica are only the biggest gainers in this regard.  
If one splits the region by those countries south and north of Panama, the contrast in 
performance is even more stark than that shown in the table.  South America and Panama  
Table 6: exports and imports 1997-99
1997 1999 1997 1999
Latin America 326862 339850 356862 359550
Costa Rica 5478 8150 5690 7540
D. Republic 7061 8110 7780 9580
Mexico 121831 148300 122424 154620
sub total 134370 164560 135894 171740
C Amer+Caribbean 
north of Panama 142798 173575 147282 185335
South America 184064 166275 209580 174215
total exports total imports
Rest of L. 
America 192492 175290 220968 187810
Source:  Balance Preliminar de las economies de America Latina y el 
Caribe, CEPAL (1999).  In millions of current dollars. 
 16
had a 10% reduction in exports and a 17% reduction in imports compared to a gain of 
21% in exports and 26% in imports for their northern neighbors. 
 
Most of the difference in performance between Central and South America undoubtedly 
relates to the internal conditions in their main respective export markets.  South American 
exports go primarily to Asia and Europe, while Central America’s and the Caribbean’s go 
to the United States.  Japan and Europe has had a period of slow growth.  Meanwhile the 
United States has been in an extended boom period.  These relative trends outside the 
region must have been reinforced by slow growth in Brazil, a major export market for 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay.   
 
The contribution of falling exports to the growth slowdown in South America did not 
come from the sort of destructive import substitution that we discussed earlier.  That is 
import substitution was not displacing domestic production and causing recession except 
possibly in Argentina and Brazil. Overall we can see from table six that the reduction in 
imports in the slow growing areas exceeded the reduction in exports.  If one calculated 
the ratio of imports to income, there is not a single country in South America in which 
that ratio increased as their growth either slowed down or went negative between 1997 
and 1999.  Where the foreign sector exerted a contractionary influence, it is falling 
exports and not rising imports that are the reason.  What the experience of South America 
in the last several years has shown is that the export-led growth model can as easily 
become an export-led decline when there is a significant contraction in countries’ 
external markets. 
 
To shed more light on the causes of the slowdown since 1995, we performed the same 
sort of decomposition analysis that underlies table 3 for the eleven countries that were 
most affected.
7  That analysis shows that the slowdown was not caused by contractionary 
fiscal policy, expect possibly in Ecuador, nor was it casued by a reduction in investment.  
Government spending adds to demand in all ten cases, and tax receipts fall as well in four 
of the eight for which we have data.  These expansionary fiscal effects are the largest 
source of demand growth in Colombia and Paraguay.  The investment share did fall a bit 
in 1995 in four countries, El Salvador, Paraguay, Peru and Colombia, but even these 
countries were investing over 20% of GDP in 1998.  In the remaining six countries the 
investment share increased and the contribution of investment growth to the overall 
change in GDP was strongly positive.  For the most part these countries continued to 
invest strongly, but they did not get much growth for their efforts. 
 
The export-led growth strategy is not working well for most countries in the region. 
 
As we have seen, exports have not provided the dynamic growth needed to produce really 
rapid income growth, in most countries in the region, particularly those in South 
America.  Partly that is because markets in developed countries for the goods produced 
by developing countries have not been growing as rapidly as they did earlier.   (only 9.7% 
between 1995 and 1998 or 4.8% per year compared to 9.7% per year between 1991 and 
                                                
7 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, El Salvador and 
Venezuela.  
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1995).  But there is another factor at work and that is that Latin America is losing market 
share as well.  
 
 
Consider the evidence in table 7.  There we show the total value of exports of each of the 
countries of South America plus Panama broken down by destination for the years1995-
1999.  These are the countries that we found earlier have been particularly affected by the 
slowdown in overall income growth in the last half of the 1990s.  The table also shows 
the total imports from LDCs of all the industrialized countries, including and excluding 




1995 1998 1991 1995 1998 estmate
Argentina 6632 7764 11975 20391 25227 22056
Bolivia 707 711 849 1139 1320 1213
Brazil 26122 27980 31620 46605 51152 47339
Chile 10065 9118 9028 16538 15192 15734
Colombia 6501 7901 7244 9859 11579 12620
Ecuador 2872 3168 2883 4358 4908 5026
Panama 934 514 342 1500 706 568
Paraguay 228 381 792 919 1259 888
Peru 3477 3948 3329 5513 5635 5948
Uruguay 623 686 1588 2121 2769 2427
Venezuela 12272 11470 4072 18457 17161 20055
total 70433 73641 73722 127400 136908 133874
98/95   95/91 98/95 99/95




growth per year 
95-98
total imports 2602 3392 3831 0.0685 0.0414
imports from 
LDCs 667 966 1112 0.0970 0.0480
total imports 509.299 770.947 944.644 0.1092 0.0700
imports from 
LDCs 210.684 342.034 439.412 0.1288 0.0870
total imports 2092.701 2621.053 2886.356 0.0579 0.0326
imports from 
LDCs 456.316 623.966 672.588 0.0814 0.0253
United States (billions of $)
industrial countries less US (billions of $)
Industrialized countries (billions of $)
Table 7:  Exports from South America and imports of industrialized countries.
total exports in millions of $
exports to industrial countries 
in millions of $
growth rate 
per year
Source:  IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks. Estimates for 1999 are based on 
CEPAL indexes of the total value of exports for 1999 and 1998, applied to the IMF 1998 
data. 
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First of all, there has been a very significant slowdown in export growth for these 
countries in the last five years-from 14.8% per year 1991-1995 to only 1.25% between 
1995 and 1999.  Judging by the 1995-98 data for which we can separate exports by 
destination, the slowdown is concentrated in Latin exports to developed countries. They 
grew only 1.5% per year compared to growth overall of 2.4% per year.  
 
Partly the slowdown must be due to slow growth in most industrial countries.  Their 
growth rate of imports from LDCs has been cut in half between the first and the second 
half of the decade.  (from 9.7% to 4.8%).  A growth rate of 4.8% is not a large number, 
but even it is significantly higher than the growth rate of South American exports into 
these markets.  It is only 1.5% per year.  The Latin countries have therefore been losing 
market share.  This is not just because South America  exports more to Europe and Japan 
than it does to the United States.  We have separated out the US data to make this point 
clear.  Total imports from LDC’s of the non-US industrialized countries grew by only 
2.5% per year between 1995 and 1998, but that is still faster than the growth rate of 1.5% 
of Latin American exports into those markets, From the evidence available the situation 
has worsened in 1999 thanks to sharp reductions in total exports in Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Uruguay, Panama, and Paraguay.     
 
I conclude that export promotion as a growth strategy is not working very well in these 
countries.  Partly that may be a short run problem of cyclic downturns in natural resource 
product markets and slow growth in total demand for the sorts of products Latin countries 
sell.  But the loss of market share time indicates that there is something else going on at 
the same time.  Latin America could be specialized in the wrong products or the wrong 
countries–ones where the overall growth in demand is low.  Or it could be that Latin 
export activities have failed to modernize and cut costs to more effectively compete 
against other developing countries.  Whatever the cause of the export slowdown is, no 
export-led growth strategy is going to work if it cannot produce an export growth rate 
higher than 2-3% per year. 
 
Conclusions and implications 
 
Too many countries in the region have failed to find a stable, sustainable growth strategy.  
They have significantly overhauled and reformed their economic policies, privatized their 
state enterprises and raised their investment rates and increased their reliance on market 
signals and market incentives.  But the results in too many countries have been meager.  
As the time since the adoption of the reforms has increased, the growth rates have 
declined instead of increasing as was expected. The reforms themselves cannot be 
blamed for this outcome.  Countries further along in the reform process have 
outperformed the slow reformers in most cases.  Nor is the slowdown due to a lack of 
investment.  In most countries investment rates have risen, but they are now producing 
less growth than they used to.  Nor was the slowdown caused by volatile capital inflows 
and reductions in foreign investment.  Those did occur but they seem more the result than 
the cause of the economic slowdowns in most countries.   
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The main factor that has changed in recent years is the performance of exports.  Export 
growth has fallen sharply in the last five years for the majority of the countries in the 
region.  Partly that is because the overall demand for developing country exports has 
slowed down due to slower growth in Europe and Japan.  But on top of that, Latin 
countries have been losing market share, particularly those south of Panama.  As a result 
exports net of imports are no longer the significant source of growth that they were 
earlier in the decade.  A few countries, notably Mexico, Costa Rica and the Dominican 
Republic escaped from this slowdown.  Each of them has developed a special export 
niche that has permitted or induced rapid overall growth.  The lesson here seems to be 
that countries need a special action or intervention such as NAFTA in Mexico, Intel in 
Costa Rica or a duty free zone in the Dominican Republic in order to produce an export 
growth rate fast enough to support rapid growth overall.   
 
Most countries have been unable to duplicate the successes of these three economies.  To 
do so, a simple reliance on market signals and profit incentives is not likely to be 
sufficient, though it is probably necessary.  Export potential and export markets have to 
be developed.  That may take special laws, special incentives for foreign investors and 
other actions all of which will require a cooperative effort of private capital and 
government to develop those areas in which a country has a potential comparative 
advantage.  At the very least policymakers should manage the exchange rate so that it 
favors rather than penalizes exporters and producers of import substitutes even if that 
creates some inflation risk.  The currency appreciations of the 1990s are one of the 
factors that has curtailed the overall growth rate of tradables.   
 
In addition to that government has a role to play in the development and promotion of 
exports markets, investments in infrastructure, subsidizing research and training, quality 
control and many other actions.  The reforms of the Washington consensus should not be 
thought of getting the government out of all activities that have an impact on the market.  
Government necessarily has a role to play in activities which the market alone performs 
badly or not at all and whose object is a faster rate of growth.  The lesson of recent Latin 
experience is that markets alone do not guarantee a stable or a rapid growth rate.  It is 
going to take a positive alliance between a reformed government, the private sector and 
foreign investors to get the economies of the region back on a satisfactory growth 
trajectory.  In the next stage of the reforms, policymakers need to be thinking more about 
what they need to do to support increased domestic production in both the export and 
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